













CENTRO STUDI LUCA D’AGLIANO 





























The global crisis and the expansionary government reaction in many countries has re-
vamped the attention of policy makers and academics on the growth eﬀects of large public
debts. Recent empirical studies investigate the impact of public debt on growth in advanced
and emerging countries. This paper aims at complementing the existing evidence focusing
on developing countries, where the increase in domestic borrowing, already started before
the crisis, requires a more comprehensive analysis, based not only on external debt, but on
total public debt. Results on a panel of low- and middle-income countries over the period
1990-2007 show that public debt has a negative impact on output growth up to a threshold
of 90 percent of GDP, beyond which its eﬀect becomes irrelevant. This non-linear eﬀect can
be explained by country-speciﬁc factors since debt overhang is a growth constraint only in
countries with sound macroeconomic policies and stable institutions.
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11 Introduction and related literature
The global crisis and the expansionary government reaction in many countries, culminated in a
fast-growing US government debt and in unsustainable public debts in some European countries
(notably Greece and Ireland), has revamped the attention of practitioners, policy makers and
academics on the adverse eﬀects of a large public debt. On March 2010, the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements deﬁned as unsustainable the prospects of public debt in several industrialized
countries (Cecchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli, 2010). Similarly, on September 2010, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) released three position papers on unsustainable debt levels in
advanced economies and its director of Fiscal Aﬀairs Department, Carlo Cottarelli, said that
“public debt levels among advanced economies have reached levels not seen before in the absence of
a major war”. Other than the relationship between government debt and crisis, largely explored
by the literature (Panizza and Levy Yeyati, 2010), also the knowledge of whether, when and
to what extent public debt impinges on economic growth (even without a default) is a critical
issue in the debate on ﬁscal policy between who supports a strong ﬁscal stimulus to sustain the
aggregate demand and who invokes the long-run adverse consequences of budget deﬁcits and
government debt. While the vast majority of commentators and the few recent academic papers
on this subject (Reinhart and Rogoﬀ, 2010b) deal predominantly with industrialized countries,
as also the political debate does, this paper argues that a growing public debt might be a source
of concern also for several low- and middle-income countries. Since the 1990s, a number of
developing and emerging countries started substituting external with domestic debt (Panizza,
2008): between 1990 and 2004, the share of domestic debt in total public debt increased from
38 to 58 percent in a sample of 25 large emerging countries (Hanson, 2007), and domestic debt
increased substantially also in low-income countries, many of whom beneﬁted from debt relief
(Arnone and Presbitero, 2010). Because of the 2007 global ﬁnancial crisis, in addition to this
trend, developing countries have to deal with a deteriorating ﬁscal balance due to growing public
spending and lower revenues1.
The economic literature has investigated many channels through which a growing public
debt might hamper long-run growth prospects in developing countries, particularly focusing on
foreign borrowing. First, a large public debt might create debt overhang, a situation in which
investment are reduced or postponed since the private sector anticipates that the returns from
their investment will serve to pay back creditors (Krugman, 1988; Sachs, 1989). Besides, a
high level of public debt can have adverse consequences on the macroeconomic stability (Singh,
2006), discouraging capital inﬂows while favoring capital ﬂight (Alesina and Tabellini, 1989;
Cerra, Rishi and Saxena, 2008), and increasing the incumbent politicians’ incentive to “gamble
for redemption”, leading to higher policy volatility (Malone, 2010). Even if total investment
does not lower signiﬁcantly, the overall productivity can, since the uncertainty on future gov-
ernment actions to meet burdensome debt obligations might push investors to prefer short-term
and low-risk investment to long-term and risky projects (Fosu, 1996; Serven, 1997). The private
sector could also face more binding ﬁnancing constraints since, particularly in countries with a
signiﬁcant share of domestic debt and underdeveloped ﬁnancial markets, credit rationing can
be the result of reduced savings, of increasing interest rates and of the banks’ preference for
risk-free government securities (Christensen, 2005; Hanson, 2007; Harrabi, Bousrih and Salisu,
2007). Other than debt stock, also the associated payment ﬂows might impinge on growth and
investment: debt service in several countries soaks up a signiﬁcant amount of (scant) government
revenues, reducing the available resources to fund (much needed) public investment in infras-
tructure (Cohen, 1993). The crowding out eﬀect, while not always applicable to external debt
1The IMF calculates that the ﬁscal balance in emerging and developing economies decreased from 0.51 in 2007
to -4.37 in 2009 (International Monetary Fund, 2010).
2to poor countries, given the high degree of loan concessionality and the low repayment rates,
is much more likely to work when considering total public debt, given a larger interest bill on
domestic debt (Arnone and Presbitero, 2010).
On the empirical side, however, the evidence is quite limited and it generally deals exclusively
with public external debt in low- and middle-income countries. Several studies were produced
as a reaction of two waves of (external) debt crisis, the ﬁrst aﬀecting several Latin-American
countries in the 1980s (Green and Villanueva, 1991; Savvides, 1992) and the second concerning
the debt relief policies which targeted a number of heavily indebted and poor countries (HIPC)
(Arnone and Presbitero, 2010; Cordella, Ricci and Ruiz-Arranz, 2010). The focus on foreign
borrowing, while going back to Keynes’ discussion of Germany’s war reparations, can not be
justiﬁed by the relative frequency of debt crisis related to either external or domestic debt, as
recently pointed out by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009): over the long time span 1800-2006, as well
as over the shorter period 1940-2006, the incidence of default on debt to domestic and foreign
creditors was not statistically diﬀerent. The focus of empirical research on external debt can
be ascribed to the lack of available and reliable comparable data on domestic debt for a large
sample of countries. Poor data availability, however, can be itself due to the limited interest of
international ﬁnancial institutions, at least until few years ago, on the issue of domestic debt
in emerging and developing countries and to the lack of transparency of many governments in
publishing time series data on domestic debt (Reinhart and Rogoﬀ, 2009).
Notwithstanding a widespread data limitation, some recent eﬀorts in collecting comparable
ﬁgures on public debt makes possible to try to uncover the growth eﬀect of total public debt.
Abbas and Christensen (2010) complement the vast literature on external debt and growth ﬁnd-
ing that, in a panel of low-income countries and emerging markets, moderate levels of domestic
debt have a positive contribution to GDP growth, as a result of the development of ﬁnancial
markets, increased private savings, better institutions and political accountability, and improved
monetary policy. However, as long as the stock of domestic debt becomes too large (above the
35 percent of bank deposits), its contribution to economic growth turns negative, because of
inﬂationary pressures and of the crowding out of the private sector2. Few other studies look
directly at total public debt. Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2010b) analyze an impressive dataset on
domestic and external debt covering 44 countries for over two centuries3 and ﬁnd that govern-
ment debt is unrelated to economic growth as long as it does not exceed 90 percent of GDP;
beyond this threshold, the growth rate of highly indebted countries is signiﬁcantly lower of that
of countries whose public debt is below 90%. This non-linear eﬀect, which is diﬃcult to point out
with standard linear regression models, is present for both advanced and emerging economies.
However, Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2010b) do not carry out any empirical analysis to sort out the
direction of causality, arguing that for high levels of debt the causality should be bi-directional
(Reinhart and Rogoﬀ, 2010a)4. Similar ﬁndings are presented by Caner, Grennes and Koehler-
Geib (2010): averaging data for a large sample of industrialized and developing countries over
the period 1980-2008, Caner, Grennes and Koehler-Geib estimate a public debt threshold at
77% of GDP; the non-linearity in debt eﬀect on growth means that for moderate debt levels an
increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio helps expanding investment and translates in faster
growth, while above the threshold additional debt reduces output growth. Albeit improving
on Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2010b) thanks to the endogenous threshold estimation, this approach
2In a cross-country analysis, Arnone and Presbitero (2010) provide evidence of a negative correlation in a
sample of developing countries between the initial level of domestic debt (as a share of GDP) and subsequent
economic growth.
3The dataset is discussed extensively in Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009).
4In the same vein, an earlier analysis by Blavy (2006) also uncovers a non-monotonic relationship between
public debt and total factor productivity in a panel of 35 emerging economies; in this case, however, the threshold
is much lower.
3still does not take into account endogeneity, an issue addressed by Kumar and Woo (2010),
who ﬁnd that public debt has a linear negative eﬀect on subsequent GDP growth, TFP and
investment. Other than being statistically robust across diﬀerent econometric speciﬁcations, the
growth eﬀect of public debt is economically relevant: a 10% increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio
is associated with a reduction of 0.2 percentage points of annual per capita real GDP growth.
Moreover, consistently with Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2010b) and Caner, Grennes and Koehler-Geib
(2010), also Kumar and Woo (2010) ﬁnd some evidence of non-linearity in the debt eﬀect on
growth, which seems to be eﬀective only when public debt exceeds 90 percent of GDP. However,
their analysis is limited to a short time horizon and covers a limited sample of 38 advanced and
emerging economies.
This paper builds on this literature and contributes along diﬀerent issues. First, diﬀerently
from the development literature, we consider the growing role of internal borrowing looking
explicitly at the eﬀect of total public debt on output growth. Second, diversely from the papers
discussed above and focusing on total debt, this one looks directly at poor countries: the partial
correlation between initial total public debt and subsequent per capita GDP growth is estimated
in a large sample of low- and middle-income countries. Third, in addition to the contribution
by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2010b) and Caner, Grennes and Koehler-Geib (2010), this paper tries
to uncover possible non-linearities in a multivariate setting and adopting diﬀerent econometric
techniques. Finally, the presence of possible sources of heterogeneity in the growth eﬀect of
public debt is assessed looking at the impact of public debt conditioned to country’s policies and
institutional quality. With respect to the latter point, we argue that there are sound reasons to
expect debt overhang to be a binding constraints to investment and growth only in countries
with sound macroeconomic policies and institutions, while in countries with volatile policies
and lousy institutions, the latter are likely to hamper GDP growth, not debt, whose eﬀect is
overshadowed and becomes statistically irrelevant (Arslanalp and Henry, 2006; Presbitero, 2008;
Cordella, Ricci and Ruiz-Arranz, 2010; Arnone and Presbitero, 2010)5. In a similar vein, the
recent literature on ﬁnancial globalization and economic growth suggests a non linearity in the
eﬀect of capital ﬂows on growth, according to which ﬁnancial integration might beneﬁt only
countries which have already implemented sound macroeconomic policies and reached a stable
institutional setting (Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 2003; Kose et al., 2009; Cline, 2010;
Kose, Prasad and Taylor, 2010). Hence, only in those countries debt can impact on economic
conditions. Consistent with the threshold hypothesis, there is some recent empirical evidence
showing that a certain level of institutional quality in heavily indebted countries is required
to attract foreign investment, stimulate economic growth and beneﬁt from debt relief (Asiedu,
2003; Dessy and Vencatachellum, 2007; Harrabi, Bousrih and Salisu, 2007), suggesting that
public debt aﬀects the economic conditions of countries with good policies and institutions.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: the next Section introduces the dataset and its
sources along with the main variables; Section 3 discusses the results, focusing ﬁrstly on some
descriptive evidence supporting the necessity to look at total public debt (3.1), then presenting
the main econometric ﬁndings (3.2) and ﬁnally showing some robustness exercises (3.3). Section
4 concludes drawing some policy implications for the International Financial Institutions.
2 Data and methodology
The empirical exercise is carried out merging macroeconomic data from several diﬀerent sources
for a sample of 92 low- and middle-income countries, listed in Table 1, over the period 1990-
5Throughout the paper we refer to good/bad and strong/weak policies and institutions in a relative sense,
considering that the institutional setting and the macroeconomic framework of the average country in the sample
is far from ideal.
42007. Table 2 reports the deﬁnition, sources and summary statistics of all the variables. To
wash out possible business cycle ﬂuctuation, data are averaged over six non-overlapping three-
years periods. The main source for the macroeconomic variables are the World Development
Indicators published by the World Bank, while data on total public debt are taken from the
dataset collected by Panizza (2008)6. To take into account the issue of reverse causality, in the
same vein of Presbitero (2008) and Cordella, Ricci and Ruiz-Arranz (2010), the debt-to-GDP
ratio (PUBLIC DEBT) is measured in the ﬁrst year of the three-years period and is built
dividing total public debt by the smoothed GDP obtained applying the Hodrick and Prescott
(1997) ﬁlter7.
The equation to be estimated is a basic growth model including the main variables suggested
by the Solow (1956) model plus some other standard controls and augmented with the measure
of public indebtedness (PUBLIC DEBT):
GROWTHi;t = GDPi;t 1 + PUBLIC DEBTi;t + Xi;t0 + i + t + i;t (1)
where the lagged value of GDP (GDPt 1) measures conditional convergence and X is a vec-
tor of standard control variables including: the log of the investment rate (INV ESTMENT),
the log of the gross primary enrollment rate as a measure of human capital accumulation
(HUMAN CAPITAL)8, the overall CPIA score to take into account the role of policies and
institutions (CPIA) on economic development (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010)9, the sum of
imports and exports of goods and services over GDP as a measure of openness (OPENNESS),
and the standard deviation of inﬂation over the three-years windows (INFLATION) as a proxy
for the degree of economic uncertainty. Finally, i and t capture respectively the country and
time ﬁxed eﬀects, measured by geographic and time dummies, and i;t is the classical spherical
error term.
To take into account country ﬁxed-eﬀects, the endogeneity of the right-hand side variables
and the dynamic structure of the model, we estimate equation 1 by Generalized Method of Mo-
ments (GMM) techniques. Following a growing literature which applies GMM to panel growth
regression (Durlauf, Johnson and Temple, 2005), we use the two-step System GMM with the
Windmeijer (2005)’s ﬁnite-sample correction for the covariance matrix, which has been shown to
be more eﬃcient than the one-step estimator (Roodman, 2009a) and to perform better than the
Diﬀerenced-GMM and the within-group estimators (Hauk and Wacziarg, 2009)10. The System-
GMM exploits additional moment conditions since it consists of a system of two simultaneous
6These data such as others used to construct the ﬁnal dataset, are publicly available at the website
http://sites.google.com/site/md4stata/ (Catini, Panizza and Saade, 2010).
7Even if it received several criticisms, the HP ﬁlter withstood the test of time and is a standard method for
removing trend (Ravn and Uhlig, 2002). Given the annual frequency of GDP data, the smooth parameter is set
equal to 6.25, accordingly to what suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002).
8According to the basic and augmented Solow model (Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992) and to the empirical
ﬁndings by Levine and Renelt (1992), the growth rate of population should also be included and secondary
education should be taken as a measure of investment in human capital instead of primary education. Instead,
we choose this speciﬁcation since population growth is always not signiﬁcant and primary education is likely to
be more informative in low- and middle-income countries (Kalaitzidakis et al., 2001). However, the main ﬁndings
do not change relaxing this assumptions (see Section 3.3).
9The CPIA score is a composite index measuring the extent to which country policies and institutions create
a good environment for growth and poverty reduction. The CPIA indicators are developed by the World Bank
and reﬂect its staﬀ professional judgment, based on country knowledge, policy dialogue, and relevant publicly
available indicators. To overcome criticisms related to lack of transparency and objectivity, in 2004 the CPIA
process and methodology were extensively reviewed by an external independent panel and, starting from 2005,
these data are fully disclosed and published in World Development Indicators. The broad coverage - the CPIA
overall score is available for 136 countries - and the long time horizon (data go back to 1977) makes this indicator
very useful for empirical analysis based on panel data (International Development Association, 2007).
10For an extensive review of the empirics of economic growth using panel data, see Durlauf, Johnson and
5equations, one in levels and the other in diﬀerences, which takes, respectively, lagged ﬁrst diﬀer-
ences and lagged levels as internal instruments (Blundell and Bond, 1998). To avoid problems
related to the proliferation of instruments, which in small samples are likely to overﬁt endoge-
nous variables and to weaken the informative power of the Hansen test (Roodman, 2009b),
we follow the rule of thumb according to which the number of instrument should be close to
the number of countries (Roodman, 2009a) and limit the number of lags of endogenous vari-
ables to t-1 and t-211. As additional external instruments, we include: 1) the La Porta et al.
(1997; 1998) categorical variable identifying the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial
code of each country (LEGAL ORIGINS) and 2) the Alesina et al. (2003) measure of ethnic
fractionalization (ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION), which are both shown to aﬀect the
quality of government and policies, regulation and economic outcomes (Alesina and Ferrara,
2005; La Porta et al., 2008)
While we start modeling the debt-growth relationship as linear, we further test for the
presence of a non-monotonic eﬀect, as implied by the debt overhang hypothesis and consistently
with the recent evidence on thresholds eﬀects showed by Cordella, Ricci and Ruiz-Arranz (2010);
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2010b). Non-linearities are modeled is diﬀerent ways. We ﬁrst impose a
quadratic functional form to detect an hump-shaped relationship between debt and growth,
even if this procedure might be weakened by the presence of outliers. Thus, we also adopt a
less parametric approach, estimating a spline speciﬁcation with one or two discontinuity points
(Marsh and Cormier, 2002). Finally, we try to sort out possible heterogeneous eﬀect of public
debt on growth according to country’s policies and institutions interacting PUBLIC DEBT
with the overall CPIA score (Presbitero, 2008)12.
3 Results
3.1 Descriptive evidence: the increasing role of domestic debt
The necessity to look at total public debt instead that focusing exclusively on external debt is
testiﬁed by the fact that, since 1990, domestic debt in the whole sample of developing countries
was larger than external debt. While looking at foreign borrowing could have been a good
approximation of overall indebtedness in low-income countries, especially because of poor data
quality on internal ﬁnancing, the same is not true for middle-income countries (Figure 1). On
the whole, external public debt declined in the last two decades, while domestic debt increased
since 1995 up to 2003, when a process of deleveraging started in several countries, just before the
recent increase in public debt started in 2007, not shown in the graph, but reported by Reinhart
and Rogoﬀ (2010b). On the whole, internal borrowing does not eliminates the exchange rate
risk that a devaluation could trigger a debt crisis, but it generally comes with higher interest
rates (especially for low-income countries which were able to borrow at concessional terms from
multilateral development banks), increasing the possible crowding out eﬀect (Hanson, 2007).
Looking at single countries provide additional insight on the increasing role of internal bor-
rowing: in Figure 2 we report the evolution of domestic and external public debt over the period
Temple (2005).
11For robustness, we also show the estimates obtained collapsing the instruments set; see Section 3.3.
12We choose not to estimate the endogenous threshold according to the methodology proposed by (Hansen,
2000) and implemented also by Cordella, Ricci and Ruiz-Arranz (2010) since this procedure does not consent to
take into account the endogeneity issue. We believe that the latter is the most important problem in this kind
of exercise and in the trade-oﬀ between the two competing aims, we choose to deal with endogeneity. However,
we can limit the arbitrariness implied by the spline approach, at least partially circumventing the impossibility
to endogenously estimate the debt thresholds, running several spline speciﬁcations and choosing the ones the ﬁt
best the data.
61990-2009 in four diﬀerent countries, representing diﬀerent levels of income and geographical
regions. Jamaica is one of the most indebted countries in the world with a stock of public debt
amounting to USD 16 billion (around 128 percent of GDP), almost equally divided between
domestic and external debt. The historical evolution of public debt in Jamaica shows some sort
of substitution eﬀect between external and domestic debt, with the latter increasing substan-
tially since 1993 and especially in response to the 1995 ﬁnancial crisis which boosted government
expenditures. The shift from external to domestic debt is associated with a decline in public
investment and the large public debt seems to be a reason for low productivity (Blavy, 2006;
Presbitero, 2010). A similar pattern is observable also in Sri Lanka: since 1990 total public
debt remained almost stable around 90-100% of GDP, but the relative weight of domestic debt
increased from 40 to 60%. The relative importance of domestic borrowing in total public debt
is exempliﬁed also by the huge increase in Turkish domestic debt – from 22% to 51% in one
year – after the 2000-2001 ﬁnancial crisis which was followed by a contraction of public external
debt. Finally, Ghana, where domestic debt became larger than external debt, exempliﬁes the
situation of many heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC), where the sharp decline in external
debt, due to the HIPC and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiatives, is partially oﬀset by a rising
domestic debt (Arnone and Presbitero, 2010).
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Calculations based on data on public debt in 104 developing countries compiled by (Panizza, 2008) over the sample period
1990-2006. Not all countries are in the panel for the whole period. The income classiﬁcation include 26 low-income, 42
lower middle-income and 36 upper middle-income countries. Debt ratios are weighted averages by country’s GDP.
3.2 Multivariate analysis: public debt and subsequent growth
The results of the two-step System-GMM estimation of model 1 are reported in Table 3. The
coeﬃcient on the control variables and the p-values of the diagnostic tests are quite stable
across the diﬀerent model speciﬁcation, so we comment on them once for all. The diagnostic
tests reported at the bottom of the Table support the model’s speciﬁcation: the Hansen-J

















1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008
Ghana Jamaica
Sri Lanka Turkey




















Calculations based on data on public debt ratios over GDP drawn from diﬀerent sources. Data on Ghana are taken from
several IMF Article IV (for government domestic debt) and from the 2010 World Development Indicators database (for
public and publicly guaranteed external debt). Data on Jamaican public debt are published by the Debt Management Unit
at the Ministry of Finance and the Public Service. Data on Sri Lanka’s outstanding government debt are published by
the national Central Bank. Data on central government domestic and external debt for Turkey are drawn from Turkish
Undersecretariat of Treasury.
statistic does not reject the Over-Identifying Restrictions (OIR), conﬁrming that the internal
and external instruments can be considered valid, and the Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for
serial correlation reject the null hypothesis of not autocorrelation of the ﬁrst order and do not
reject the hypothesis of no autocorrelation of the second order.
Consistently with expectations and past evidence (Levine and Renelt, 1992; Kalaitzidakis,
Mamuneas and Stengos, 2000), there is evidence of conditional convergence and investments
both in physical and human capital have a positive, albeit not always statistically signiﬁcant,
eﬀect on growth. As in Judson and Orphanides (1999), Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas and Stengos
(2000) and Presbitero (2008), inﬂation volatility has a robust and negative eﬀect on growth,
suggesting that a stable macroeconomic environment is required to foster GDP growth. The
quality of institutions and policies has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on GROWTH, while
trade openness does not signiﬁcantly impact on economic growth, as suggested by Rodriguez and
Rodrik (2001) (but in contrast to Frankel and Romer (1999), Yanikkaya (2003) and Wacziarg and
Welch (2008), among others), especially once the eﬀect of institutions is accounted for (Rodrik,
Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004).
Coming to the key interest variable, column (1) shows that the ratio of total public debt
to GDP has a negative and monotonic eﬀect on economic growth. To test for the presence
of a hump-shaped relationship as predicted by the Debt-Laﬀer hypothesis, in column (2) we
impose a quadratic functional form. The coeﬃcients on the linear and quadratic term are jointly
signiﬁcant and the test of the presence of an inverse U-shaped relationship proposed by Lind and
Mehlum (2010) indicates that the Debt-Laﬀer curve is statistically signiﬁcant with a maximum
8in correspondence of a ratio of total public debt over GDP of 27% (PUBLIC DEBT = 3:36)13.
Columns (3) and (4) report the results of a spline speciﬁcation with one and two discontinuity
points respectively, ﬁxed at values of total public debt equal to 10 (T1) and 90 (T2) percent
of GDP. The choice of the threshold is done considering the existing evidence and trying to
ﬁnd the model that best ﬁts the data. The speciﬁcation with one break at a debt-to-GDP
ratio of 90 percent does not uncover any signiﬁcant relationship, even if a slight increase in
the threshold is consistent with a negative eﬀect of public debt up to the 100 percent of GDP
and to an irrelevance zone thereafter (Cordella, Ricci and Ruiz-Arranz, 2010)14. Imposing a
second break in the spline speciﬁcation does not aﬀect the basic result on debt overhang and
debt irrelevance, but uncovers a positive and strong eﬀect of debt on growth as long as total
public debt is below 10 percent of GDP. This positive correlation can explain the signiﬁcance
of the bell curve estimated in column (2). At the same time, however, it makes clear that
imposing a quadratic speciﬁcation can lead to misleading results, since only about two percent
of sample observations fall below the 10% thresholds, while the 75% of observation are in the
debt overhang zone (debt-to-GDP ratio between 10 and 90 percent) and the remaining 23% in
the debt irrelevance zone (debt-to-GDP ratio above 90 percent). The impact of public debt is
economically signiﬁcant: in the short run, an increase of the public debt-to-GDP ratio by 30
percentage points, as happened in Turkey after the 2000-2001 ﬁnancial crisis (Figure 2), costs
1.5 percentage points in economic growth.
Finally, in the last column we try to disentangle the source of the non-monotonicity allowing
for an heterogeneous eﬀect of PUBLIC DEBT on growth according to the country policy and
institutional framework. Consistently with previous evidence on external debt (Arnone and
Presbitero, 2010; Cordella, Ricci and Ruiz-Arranz, 2010), the empirical evidence supports the
hypothesis that public debt is a growth constraint only in countries with good policies and strong
institutions. The economic impact is slightly larger than the one estimated on the whole sample,
since a 30 percent increase in the debt ratio is associated with a slowdown in output growth by
1.6 percent. By contrast, where policies and institutions are lousy, public debt is not correlated
with GDP growth, which, instead, is likely to be constrained by macroeconomic instability and
by the poor institutional framework. The coeﬃcients on the CPIA dummy, in fact, show that
the GDP growth rate of the average country with bad policies is half percentage point lower
than the one of countries with good policies15. In support of this interpretation, which help
explaining the non-linear eﬀect of debt on growth (column 4), summary statistics show that
total public debt is much lower where institutions and policies are strong (CPIA3:5 = 1) than
where are weak (CPIA3:5 = 0), consistently a positive association between indebtedness and
policy volatility (Malone, 2010)16.
In sum, as illustrated in Figure 3, the empirical results make clear that the hump-shaped
13Lind and Mehlum (2010) develop a test to avoid the misleading interpretation of a concave but monotone
curve with an inverse U-shaped one, frequent when the turning point is too close to (or beyond) the end point of
the data range. The procedure jointly tests whether the relationship between growth and debt is increasing at
low values and decreasing at high values of PUBLIC DEBT within the sample, and it is implemented in Stata
by the command UTEST.
14We prefer to leave the 90 percent threshold also for reason of comparability with the evidence documented
by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2010b) and by Kumar and Woo (2010). Estimating a spline speciﬁcation with one
discontinuity point in occurrence with a level of public debt equal to 10 percent of GDP uncover a positive
(negative) correlation before (after) the threshold. These results are not shown (but are available upon request
from the author) for reasons of space and because they are less informative than the reported model with two
breaks.
15Summary statistics point out that countries with sound policies and institutions grow twice faster than the
ones with a weak institutional setting.
16Speciﬁcally, total public debt is equal to 49 (66) percent of GDP in the average country with good (bad)
institutions and policies and the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant.
9curve is driven by few observations. Considering the whole sample of countries and ignoring
country-speciﬁc characteristics, actual data show that, apart from for very low values of total
public debt, the basic relationship between PUBLIC DEBT and GROWTH is monotonic and
negative up to a threshold (total public debt over GDP equal to 90%, see the left-hand diagram)
and irrelevant thereafter. This basic ﬁnding uncovers – and can be explained by – country-
speciﬁc characteristics: debt overhang is a primary constraint to investment and growth where
the policy and institutional setting is stable, while total public debt does not matter for output
growth as long as institutions are weak and macroeconomic policies bad (right-hand diagram).
This result is consistent with a generalization of the Krugman’s (1988) model of debt overhang
in which a large eternal debt increases the incentive for incumbent government to “gamble for
redemption” in order to avoid the high-probability job loss following an eventual default (Malone,
2010). Large debts go hand in hand with worsening macroeconomic policies and output and
policy volatility, overshadowing the adverse eﬀect of debt on economic growth.
Figure 3: Public debt and growth
Debt/GDP = 10%
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(b) Institutions and policies heterogeneity
Notes: Elaboration on estimates reported in Table 3, columns 4 (left panel) and 5 (right panel). BAD CPIA
(GOOD CPIA) refers to countries with an overall CPIA score lower than (equal to or greater than) 3.5.
3.3 Robustness
This section discusses some robustness exercises undertaken to validate the main ﬁndings of
the paper. On the whole, results do not change with diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the main variables
(GROWTH and PUBLIC DEBT), with the inclusion of additional control variables and con-
trolling for the problem of the proliferation of instruments in the GMM estimates (Roodman,
2009a). In Table 4 we address the endogeneity issue taking past values of public debt instead
of the ones in the ﬁrst year of the three-years period. While there is no more evidence of a
basic linear and negative relationship between DEBT and GROWTH and also the quadratic
speciﬁcation looses signiﬁcance, the main ﬁndings are conﬁrmed. Public debt has a strong and
negative impact on output growth for intermediate levels of indebtedness, while when public
debt is above 90 percent of GDP, its eﬀect on growth is not signiﬁcant. Again, this non linearity
can be easily accommodated taking into account country heterogeneity: column (5) conﬁrms
that, even considering past values of public debt, the overhang eﬀect matters only for countries
with good policies and institutions. As regards the coeﬃcients on the control variables and the
diagnostic tests, the values are broadly similar to the ones reported in Table 4, suggesting that
10the growth model is well speciﬁed.
In Table 5 we test the robustness of the main ﬁndings across changes in the set of control
variables. The ﬁrst four columns augment the preferred spline speciﬁcation (Table 3, column
4), while the last four columns refer to the model allowing for the diﬀerentiated debt eﬀect on
growth according to the CPIA score (Table 3, column 5). Speciﬁcally, we include the population
growth rate (POPULATION), a measure of private credit over GDP (CREDIT) and a dummy
variable characterizing a regime as democratic (DEMOCRACY )17; in columns 4 and 8 we
also re-run the estimates measuring GDP (and its growth rate) at purchasing power parity
(GDP PPP). In all the speciﬁcations, the main conclusions drawn in Section 3.2 are conﬁrmed,
even if the additional controls do not generally show any robust correlation with output growth.
Finally, Table 6 presents the estimates obtained collapsing the instrument set, so that the
number of instruments is signiﬁcantly lower than the number of countries included in the sample.
As in the previous regressions, the diagnostic tests support the model speciﬁcation and the
Hansen test of Over-Identifying Restrictions still validates the identiﬁcation of the model and
shows p-values lower than the ones reported in previous regressions. Even with a parsimonious
instrument set, results are broadly conﬁrmed and, if any, the negative debt eﬀect on growth
increases (column 4).
4 Conclusions
The evidence discussed in the paper on the relationship between total public debt and economic
growth in low- and middle-income countries is consistent with the presence of a debt overhang
and a debt irrelevance zones, as already found with respect to external debt (Cordella, Ricci and
Ruiz-Arranz, 2010). The threshold separating the two zones is at a level of public debt equal
to around 90 percent of GDP. This ﬁnding apparently contrasts to the widely cited evidence
discussed by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2010b) about grow slowdowns when public debt exceeds
90 percent of GDP. However, apart from diﬀerences in the methodological approach, the main
reason explaining the antithetic results is likely to be the composition of the sample. In this vein,
the evidence provided by this paper complements the one introduced by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ
(2010b), Caner, Grennes and Koehler-Geib (2010) and Kumar and Woo (2010): while they
show that a debt burden above 90 percent is likely to hinder growth in advanced countries, we
provide evidence that debt overhang in low and middle-income countries is a growth constraint
also for lower levels of debt. This is consistent with the hypothesis of debt sustainability and
debt management capacity increasing with income. Industrialized countries are better able
than developing ones to borrow and use domestic and foreign ﬁnancing in a productive way,
without paying the costs in terms of disincentive to investment, capital ﬂight, policy volatility
and crowding out, that generally goes hand in hand with large debts. By contrast, in developing
countries the negative consequences of debt overhang are likely to oﬀset the possible beneﬁts
deriving from the availability of additional resources. The main reason for this opposite result
is related to poor economic management and bad institutions, consistent with a “gambling for
redemption” interpretation of the classical debt overhang model (Malone, 2010). In fact, the
last piece of evidence discussed in the paper shows that country-speciﬁc factors aﬀect the way
in which debt aﬀect the economy: as already shown with respect to external debt (Presbitero,
17We show the results obtained using the dummy variable proposed by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010),
but results do not change adopting the continuous polity score calculated by the Polity IV project (Marshall,
Gurr and Jaggers, 2010). Similarly, we controlled the robustness of our conclusions including a number of the
other variables used in the growth literature, without ﬁnding signiﬁcant changes in the debt eﬀect on growth.
Given the lack of informative power of this exercise, we choose to show only the results relative to the most
widely used variables.
112008; Cordella, Ricci and Ruiz-Arranz, 2010), also total public debt is a constraint for economic
growth only in countries with sound institutions and stable macroeconomic policies. Thus,
irrespective of the income level, poor institution and policies are likely to be the ﬁrst-order
constraint to growth. Where and when the institutional framework is sound, public debt has
real eﬀects on the economy: according to Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2010b) and Caner, Grennes
and Koehler-Geib (2010), in industrialized countries debt overhang emerges as long as debt is
particularly high – at least above 77 percent –, while the evidence discussed in the paper suggests
that in developing countries, where institutions and macroeconomic policies are less strong, debt
overhang is eﬀective for an intermediate level of indebtedness. In addition, where debt is larger,
macroeconomic policies are generally worse and more volatile and they overshadow the possible
negative eﬀects of debt on output growth, which become statistically not signiﬁcant.
From a policy perspective, the results discussed in the paper can help shaping borrowing
and debt relief policies. Speciﬁcally, the presence of a negative eﬀect of total public debt on
economic growth in developing countries has to be taken into consideration and requires a shift
from a paradigm based almost exclusively on external debt to a new one based on both domestic
and external debt, as recently recognized also by the IMF and the World Bank. Furthermore,
as regard debt relief, it should be based on the amount of the stock of total public debt and
it should be targeted only to countries with sound institutions, since only there public debt is
likely to be a binding constraint to growth. If the eligibility criteria are measurable, realistic and
public ex-ante, conditional debt relief would be not only economically eﬃcient – maximizing the
beneﬁts of debt reduction in times of shrinking aid budgets –, but it will also provide the right
incentives, working as an incentive-based “pull” mechanism to improve policy and institutional
framework.
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16A Tables
Table 1: Sample of 92 low- and middle-income countries
Code Country Income Region Code Country Income Region
ALB Albania LMIC ECA LKA Sri Lanka LMIC SA
ARG Argentina UMIC LAC LSO Lesotho LMIC SSA
ARM Armenia LMIC ECA LTU Lithuania UMIC ECA
BDI Burundi LIC SSA LVA Latvia UMIC ECA
BGR Bulgaria UMIC ECA MAR Morocco LMIC MENA
BLR Belarus UMIC ECA MDA Moldova LMIC ECA
BLZ Belize LMIC LAC MEX Mexico UMIC LAC
BOL Bolivia LMIC LAC MNG Mongolia LMIC EAP
BRA Brazil UMIC LAC MOZ Mozambique LIC SSA
BTN Bhutan LMIC SA MRT Mauritania LIC SSA
BWA Botswana UMIC SSA MUS Mauritius UMIC SSA
CHL Chile UMIC LAC MWI Malawi LIC SSA
CHN China LMIC EAP MYS Malaysia UMIC EAP
CIV Cote d’Ivoire LMIC SSA NAM Namibia UMIC SSA
CMR Cameroon LMIC SSA NIC Nicaragua LMIC LAC
COD Congo, DR LIC SSA NPL Nepal LIC SA
COL Colombia UMIC LAC PAK Pakistan LMIC SA
CPV Cape Verde LMIC SSA PAN Panama UMIC LAC
CRI Costa Rica UMIC LAC PER Peru UMIC LAC
DJI Djibouti LMIC MENA PHL Philippines LMIC EAP
DOM Dominican Rep. UMIC LAC POL Poland UMIC ECA
DZA Algeria UMIC MENA PRY Paraguay LMIC LAC
ECU Ecuador LMIC LAC ROU Romania UMIC ECA
EGY Egypt LMIC MENA RUS Russian Federation UMIC ECA
ERI Eritrea LIC SSA RWA Rwanda LIC SSA
ETH Ethiopia LIC SSA SDN Sudan LMIC SSA
FJI Fiji UMIC EAP SEN Senegal LIC SSA
GAB Gabon UMIC SSA SLE Sierra Leone LIC SSA
GEO Georgia LMIC ECA SLV El Salvador LMIC LAC
GHA Ghana LIC SSA SWZ Swaziland LMIC SSA
GIN Guinea LIC SSA TCD Chad LIC SSA
GMB Gambia LIC SSA THA Thailand LMIC EAP
GRD Grenada UMIC LAC TJK Tajikistan LIC ECA
GTM Guatemala LMIC LAC TON Tonga LMIC EAP
GUY Guyana LMIC LAC TUN Tunisia LMIC MENA
HND Honduras LMIC LAC TUR Turkey UMIC ECA
IDN Indonesia LMIC EAP UGA Uganda LIC SSA
IND India LMIC SA UKR Ukraine LMIC ECA
JOR Jordan LMIC MENA URY Uruguay UMIC LAC
KAZ Kazakhstan UMIC ECA UZB Uzbekistan LIC ECA
KEN Kenya LIC SSA VCT St. Vincent & Grenadines UMIC LAC
KGZ Kyrgyz Rep. LIC ECA VEN Venezuela UMIC LAC
KHM Cambodia LIC EAP VUT Vanuatu LMIC EAP
LAO Lao PDR LIC EAP ZAF South Africa UMIC SSA
LBN Lebanon UMIC MENA ZMB Zambia LIC SSA
LCA St. Lucia UMIC LAC ZWE Zimbabwe LIC SSA
Notes: The 3-letters country code, and the income and geographic classiﬁcation is taken from the World Bank (see the
website at: http://go.worldbank.org/K2CKM78CC0). ECA: Europe & Central Asia; SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa; SA: South
Asia; EAP: East Asia & Paciﬁc; LAC: Latin America & Caribbean; MENA: North Africa & Middle East.
17Table 2: Variables: description, sources and summary statistics
Variable Description Mean St. Dev.
GROWTH Annual per capita GDP growth calculated ad log-diﬀerence of
GDP. Source: WDI.
0.024 0.033
GDP Logarithm of per capita GDP at constant US dollar. Source:
WDI.
6.940 1.089
INV ESTMENT Logarithm of gross capital formation (% GDP). Source: WDI. 3.083 0.354
INFLATION Logarithm of 1 plus the standard deviation of inﬂation over the





Logarithm of the primary gross school enrollment (%). Source:
WDI.
4.585 0.232
OPENNESS Logarithm of the sum of exports and imports of goods and
services (% GDP). Source: WDI.
4.266 0.503
CPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessment overall score (or
IDA resource allocation index). Source: WDI and internal
(conﬁdential) data set.
3.568 0.627
PUBLIC DEBT Logarithm of total public debt over ﬁltered GDP measured in the
ﬁrst year of the three-years window. Source: Panizza (2008).
4.045 0.717
LEGAL ORIGINS Categorical variable identifying the country’s legal origin of the





Index of of ethnic fractionalization. Source: Alesina et al. (2003). 0.482 0.229
POPULATION Population growth (annual %). Source: WDI. 1.596 1.132
CREDIT Domestic credit provided by banking sector over GDP. Source:
WDI.
0.456 0.410
DEMOCRACY Dummy variable equal to one for countries with a democratic
regime. Source: Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010)
0.514 0.495
GROWTH PPP Annual per capita GDP growth calculated ad log-diﬀerence of
GDP PPP. Source: WDI.
0.024 0.032
GDP PPP Logarithm of per capita GDP at constant 2005 international
purchasing power parity. Source: WDI.
7.995 0.924
Notes: Statistics are calculated on the sample of 92 low- and middle-income countries (see Table 1), apart from variables
for which there are missing values. All variables are non-overlapping three-years averages, apart from PUBLIC DEBT
which is taken at the ﬁrst year of the ﬁve-years period.
18Table 3: Total public debt and economic growth: base model
Dep. Var.: GROWTH 1 2 3 4 5
GDPt 1 -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.018***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
INV ESTMENT 0.021** 0.026** 0.021** 0.015 0.027***
[0.022] [0.041] [0.036] [0.135] [0.002]
INFLATION -0.007** -0.007*** -0.007** -0.007*** -0.011***
[0.033] [0.009] [0.014] [0.000] [0.001]
HUMAN CAPITAL 0.047*** 0.033* 0.037 0.025 0.040*
[0.007] [0.088] [0.132] [0.146] [0.092]
OPENNESS -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 0.000 -0.002
[0.707] [0.897] [0.623] [0.964] [0.679]
CPIA 0.015*** 0.013** 0.014*** 0.018***
[0.003] [0.017] [0.006] [0.000]















CPIA3:5  PUBLIC DEBT -0.019**
[0.018]
Observations 320 320 320 320 320
Countries 92 92 92 92 92
AR(1) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.003
AR(2) 0.818 0.801 0.929 0.81 0.791
Hansen OIR 0.711 0.932 0.919 0.998 0.774
Notes: The table reports regression coeﬃcients and, in brackets, the associated robust standard errors. * signiﬁcant at
10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. The model is estimated by Two-Step System GMM, using Stata 11
SE package with XTABOND2 command. As instruments, we use (t-1) and (t-2) lagged values of endogenous variables.
Six geographic and ﬁve time dummies (included in the regressions but not shown for reasons of space) are taken as
strictly exogenous regressors. LEGAL ORIGINS and ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION are included as additional
instruments. PUBLIC DEBT is taken in the ﬁrst year of the three-years period. In the spline speciﬁcation (columns 3
and 4), the discontinuity points T1 and T2 are set, respectively, at a level of public debt equal to 10 and 90 percent of
GDP (PUBLIC DEBT equal to 2.398 and 4.511). As diagnostic, the table reports the p-values of the Hansen test for
overidentifying restrictions (OIR, the null is the validity of the instrument set) and of the Arellano and Bond autocorrelation
tests of ﬁrst and second order (AR(1) and AR(2), the null is no autocorrelation).
19Table 4: Total public debt and economic growth: past debt ratios
Dep. Var.: GROWTH 1 2 3 4 5
GDPt 1 -0.018*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.017***
[0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
INV ESTMENT 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.032** 0.026** 0.037***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.014] [0.032] [0.000]
INFLATION -0.009*** -0.008** -0.009** -0.009*** -0.011***
[0.005] [0.016] [0.012] [0.002] [0.002]
HUMAN CAPITAL 0.044* 0.029 0.041* 0.011 0.032
[0.088] [0.271] [0.093] [0.614] [0.132]
OPENNESS -0.007 -0.005 -0.010 -0.004 -0.007
[0.340] [0.619] [0.178] [0.569] [0.192]
CPIA 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008
[0.147] [0.103] [0.161] [0.209]
















CPIA3:5  PUBLIC DEBTt 1 -0.017**
[0.037]
Observations 324 324 324 324 324
Countries 92 92 92 92 92
AR(1) 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001
AR(2) 0.979 0.836 0.988 0.201 0.658
Hansen OIR 0.626 0.839 0.865 0.978 0.773
Notes: The table reports regression coeﬃcients and, in brackets, the associated robust standard errors. * signiﬁcant at
10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. The model is estimated by Two-Step System GMM, using Stata 11
SE package with XTABOND2 command. As instruments, we use (t-1) and (t-2) lagged values of endogenous variables.
Six geographic and ﬁve time dummies (included in the regressions but not shown for reasons of space) are taken as
strictly exogenous regressors. LEGAL ORIGINS and ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION are included as additional
instruments. PUBLIC DEBTt 1 is taken in the previous the three-years period. In the spline speciﬁcation (columns 3
and 4), the discontinuity points T1 and T2 are set, respectively, at a level of public debt equal to 10 and 90 percent of
GDP (PUBLIC DEBT equal to 2.398 and 4.511). As diagnostic, the table reports the p-values of the Hansen test for
overidentifying restrictions (OIR, the null is the validity of the instrument set) and of the Arellano and Bond autocorrelation



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21Table 6: Total public debt and economic growth: instruments collapse
Dep. Var.: GROWTH 1 2 3 4 5
GDPt 1 -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.027*** -0.020***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
INV ESTMENT 0.007 0.018 0.018 0.014 0.029***
[0.696] [0.361] [0.263] [0.349] [0.005]
INFLATION -0.006* -0.007* -0.007** -0.007** -0.011***
[0.055] [0.050] [0.033] [0.017] [0.001]
HUMAN CAPITAL 0.086*** 0.056* 0.077** 0.045* 0.038
[0.005] [0.081] [0.038] [0.085] [0.126]
OPENNESS -0.014 -0.009 -0.016 -0.016 -0.005
[0.229] [0.538] [0.192] [0.215] [0.466]
CPIA 0.020** 0.015* 0.015 0.017*
[0.020] [0.078] [0.107] [0.051]















CPIA3:5  PUBLIC DEBT -0.016*
[0.083]
Observations 320 320 320 320 320
Countries 92 92 92 92 92
AR(1) 0.005 0.011 0.006 0.017 0.002
AR(2) 0.564 0.657 0.81 0.978 0.781
Hansen OIR 0.394 0.319 0.406 0.273 0.409
Notes: The table reports regression coeﬃcients and, in brackets, the associated robust standard errors. * signiﬁcant at
10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. The model is estimated by Two-Step System GMM, using Stata 11 SE
package with XTABOND2 command. The instrument set is built collapsing the lagged values of endogenous variables.
Six geographic and ﬁve time dummies (included in the regressions but not shown for reasons of space) are taken as
strictly exogenous regressors. LEGAL ORIGINS and ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION are included as additional
instruments. PUBLIC DEBT is taken in the ﬁrst year of the ﬁve-years period. In the spline speciﬁcation (columns 3
and 4), the discontinuity points T1 and T2 are set, respectively, at a level of public debt equal to 10 and 90 percent of
GDP (PUBLIC DEBT equal to 2.398 and 4.511). As diagnostic, the table reports the p-values of the Hansen test for
overidentifying restrictions (OIR, the null is the validity of the instrument set) and of the Arellano and Bond autocorrelation
tests of ﬁrst and second order (AR(1) and AR(2), the null is no autocorrelation).
22